Classification-as-a-Service (CaaS) is widely deployed today in machine intelligence stacks for a vastly diverse set of applications including anything from medical prognosis to computer vision tasks to natural language processing to identity fraud detection. The computing power required for training complex models on large datasets to perform inference to solve these problems can be very resource-intensive. A CaaS provider may cheat a customer by fraudulently bypassing expensive training procedures in favor of weaker, less computationally-intensive algorithms which yield results of reduced quality. Given a classification service supplier $S$, intermediary CaaS provider $P$ claiming to use $S$ as a classification backend, and customer $C$, our work addresses the following questions: (i) how can $P$s claim to be using $S$ be verified by $C$? (ii) how might $S$ make performance guarantees that may be verified by $C$? and (iii) how might one design a decentralized system that incentivizes service proofing and accountability? To this end, we propose a variety of methods for $C$ to evaluate the service claims made by $P$ using probabilistic performance metrics, instance seeding, and steganography. We also propose a method of measuring the robustness of a model using a blackbox adversarial procedure, which may then be used as a benchmark or comparison to a claim made by $S$. Finally, we propose the design of a smart contract-based decentralized system that incentivizes service accountability to serve as a trusted Quality of Service (QoS) auditor.
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