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Here we explore a new algorithmic framework for multi-agent reinforcement learning, called Malthusian reinforcement learning, which extends self-play to include fitness-linked population size dynamics that drive ongoing innovation. In Malthusian RL, increases in a subpopulations average return drive subsequent increases in its size, just as Thomas Malthus argued in 1798 was the relationship between preindustrial income levels and population growth. Malthusian reinforcement learning harnesses the competitive pressures arising from growing and shrinking population size to drive agents to explore regions of state and policy spaces that they could not otherwise reach. Furthermore, in environments where there are potential gains from specialization and division of labor, we show that Malthusian reinforcement learning is better positioned to take advantage of such synergies than algorithms based on self-play.
We propose a general agent population learning system, and on this basis, we propose lineage evolution reinforcement learning algorithm. Lineage evolution reinforcement learning is a kind of derivative algorithm which accords with the general agent p
Agents that interact with other agents often do not know a priori what the other agents strategies are, but have to maximise their own online return while interacting with and learning about others. The optimal adaptive behaviour under uncertainty ov
Reinforcement Learning (RL) is an effective tool for controller design but can struggle with issues of robustness, failing catastrophically when the underlying system dynamics are perturbed. The Robust RL formulation tackles this by adding worst-case
In multi-agent reinforcement learning, the behaviors that agents learn in a single Markov Game (MG) are typically confined to the given agent number (i.e., population size). Every single MG induced by varying population sizes may possess distinct opt
We present a multi-agent actor-critic method that aims to implicitly address the credit assignment problem under fully cooperative settings. Our key motivation is that credit assignment among agents may not require an explicit formulation as long as