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تسجيل مستخدم جديدDiffusion, Influence and Best-Response Dynamics in Networks: An Action Model Approach
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نشر من قبل
Rasmus Kr{\\ae}mmer Rendsvig
تاريخ النشر
2017
مجال البحث
الهندسة المعلوماتية
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English
تأليف
Rasmus K. Rendsvig
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Threshold models and their dynamics may be used to model the spread of `behaviors in social networks. Regarding such from a modal logical perspective, it is shown how standard update mechanisms may be emulated using action models -- graphs encoding agents decision rules. A small class of action models capturing the possible sets of decision rules suitable for threshold models is identified, and shown to include models characterizing best-response dynamics of both coordination and anti-coordination games played on graphs.
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