ﻻ يوجد ملخص باللغة العربية
We consider thin incomplete financial markets, where traders with heterogeneous preferences and risk exposures have motive to behave strategically regarding the demand schedules they submit, thereby impacting prices and allocations. We argue that traders relatively more exposed to market risk tend to submit more elastic demand functions. Noncompetitive equilibrium prices and allocations result as an outcome of a game among traders. General sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of such equilibrium are provided, with an extensive analysis of two-trader transactions. Even though strategic behaviour causes inefficient social allocations, traders with sufficiently high risk tolerance and/or large initial exposure to market risk obtain more utility gain in the noncompetitive equilibrium, when compared to the competitive one.
The risk and return profiles of a broad class of dynamic trading strategies, including pairs trading and other statistical arbitrage strategies, may be characterized in terms of excursions of the market price of a portfolio away from a reference leve
In this paper, we study general monetary risk measures (without any convexity or weak convexity). A monetary (respectively, positively homogeneous) risk measure can be characterized as the lower envelope of a family of convex (respectively, coherent)
We propose a hedging approach for general contingent claims when liquidity is a concern and trading is subject to transaction cost. Multiple assets with different liquidity levels are available for hedging. Our risk criterion targets a tradeoff betwe
The large majority of risk-sharing transactions involve few agents, each of whom can heavily influence the structure and the prices of securities. This paper proposes a game where agents strategic sets consist of all possible sharing securities and p
We study combinations of risk measures under no restrictive assumption on the set of alternatives. We develop and discuss results regarding the preservation of properties and acceptance sets for the combinations of risk measures. One of the main resu