We address formally the problem of opinion dynamics when the agents of a social network (e.g., consumers) are not only influenced by their neighbors but also by an external influential entity referred to as a marketer. The influential entity tries to
sway the overall opinion as close as possible to a desired opinion by using a specific influence budget. We assume that the exogenous influences of the entity happen during discrete-time advertising campaigns; consequently, the overall closed-loop opinion dynamics becomes a linear-impulsive (hybrid) one. The main technical issue addressed is finding how the marketer should allocate its budget over time (through marketing campaigns) and over space (among the agents) such that the agents opinion be as close as possible to the desired opinion. Our main results show that the marketer has to prioritize certain agents over others based on their initial condition, their influence power in the social graph and the size of the cluster they belong to. The corresponding space-time allocation problem is formulated and solved for several special cases of practical interest. Valuable insights can be extracted from our analysis. For instance, for most cases, we prove that the marketer has an interest in investing most of its budget at the beginning of the process and that budget should be shared among agents according to the famous water-filling allocation rule. Numerical examples illustrate the analysis.
Computational advertising has been studied to design efficient marketing strategies that maximize the number of acquired customers. In an increased competitive market, however, a market leader (a leader) requires the acquisition of new customers as w
ell as the retention of her loyal customers because there often exists a competitor (a follower) who tries to attract customers away from the market leader. In this paper, we formalize a new model called the Stackelberg budget allocation game with a bipartite influence model by extending a budget allocation problem over a bipartite graph to a Stackelberg game. To find a strong Stackelberg equilibrium, a standard solution concept of the Stackelberg game, we propose two algorithms: an approximation algorithm with provable guarantees and an efficient heuristic algorithm. In addition, for a special case where customers are disjoint, we propose an exact algorithm based on linear programming. Our experiments using real-world datasets demonstrate that our algorithms outperform a baseline algorithm even when the follower is a powerful competitor.
We develop a novel optimization model to maximize the profit of a Demand-Side Platform (DSP) while ensuring that the budget utilization preferences of the DSPs advertiser clients are adequately met. Our model is highly flexible and can be applied in
a Real-Time Bidding environment (RTB) with arbitrary auction types, e.g., both first and second price auctions. Our proposed formulation leads to a non-convex optimization problem due to the joint optimization over both impression allocation and bid price decisions. Using Fenchel duality theory, we construct a dual problem that is convex and can be solved efficiently to obtain feasible bidding prices and allocation variables that can be deployed in a RTB setting. With a few minimal additional assumptions on the properties of the auctions, we demonstrate theoretically that our computationally efficient procedure based on convex optimization principles is guaranteed to deliver a globally optimal solution. We conduct experiments using data from a real DSP to validate our theoretical findings and to demonstrate that our method successfully trades off between DSP profitability and budget utilization in a simulated online environment.
Efficient testing and vaccination protocols are critical aspects of epidemic management. To study the optimal allocation of limited testing and vaccination resources in a heterogeneous contact network of interacting susceptible, recovered, and infect
ed individuals, we present a degree-based testing and vaccination model for which we use control-theoretic methods to derive optimal testing and vaccination policies. Within our framework, we find that optimal intervention policies first target high-degree nodes before shifting to lower-degree nodes in a time-dependent manner. Using such optimal policies, it is possible to delay outbreaks and reduce incidence rates to a greater extent than uniform and reinforcement-learning-based interventions, particularly on certain scale-free networks.
How to strategically allocate the available vaccines is a crucial issue for pandemic control. In this work, we propose a mathematical framework for optimal stabilizing vaccine allocation, where our goal is to send the infections to zero as soon as po
ssible with a fixed number of vaccine doses. This framework allows us to efficiently compute the optimal vaccine allocation policy for general epidemic spread models including SIS/SIR/SEIR and a new model of COVID-19 transmissions. By fitting the real data in New York State to our framework, we found that the optimal stabilizing vaccine allocation policy suggests offering vaccines priority to locations where there are more susceptible people and where the residents spend longer time outside the home. Besides, we found that offering vaccines priority to young adults (20-29) and middle-age adults (20-44) can minimize the cumulative infected cases and the death cases. Moreover, we compared our method with five age-stratified strategies in cite{bubar2021model} based on their epidemics model. We also found its better to offer vaccine priorities to young people to curb the disease and minimize the deaths when the basic reproduction number $R_0$ is moderately above one, which describes the most world during COVID-19. Such phenomenon has been ignored in cite{bubar2021model}.