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تسجيل مستخدم جديدQuantifying gender preferences across humans lifespan
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In human relations individuals gender and age play a key role in the structures and dynamics of their social arrangements. In order to analyze the gender preferences of individuals in interaction with others at different stages of their lives we study a large mobile phone dataset. To do this we consider four fundamental gender-related caller and callee combinations of human interactions, namely male to male, male to female, female to male, and female to female, which together with age, kinship, and different levels of friendship give rise to a wide scope of human sociality. Here we analyse the relative strength of these four types of interaction using a large dataset of mobile phone communication records. Our analysis suggests strong age dependence for an ego of one gender choosing to call an individual of either gender. We observe a strong opposite sex bonding across most of their reproductive age. However, older women show a strong tendency to connect to another female that is one generation younger in a way that is suggestive of the emph{grandmothering effect}. We also find that the relative strength among the four possible interactions depends on phone call duration. For calls of medium and long duration, opposite gender interactions are significantly more probable than same gender interactions during the reproductive years, suggesting potential emotional exchange between spouses. By measuring the fraction of calls to other generations we find that mothers tend to make calls more to their daughters than to their sons, whereas fathers make calls more to their sons than to their daughters. For younger people, most of their calls go to same generation alters, while older people call the younger people more frequently, which supports the suggestion that emph{affection flows downward}.
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