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تسجيل مستخدم جديدPrivacy Leakage in Mobile Computing: Tools, Methods, and Characteristics
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نشر من قبل
Muhammad Haris Mughees Mr.
تاريخ النشر
2014
مجال البحث
الهندسة المعلوماتية
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English
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The number of smartphones, tablets, sensors, and connected wearable devices are rapidly increasing. Today, in many parts of the globe, the penetration of mobile computers has overtaken the number of traditional personal computers. This trend and the always-on nature of these devices have resulted in increasing concerns over the intrusive nature of these devices and the privacy risks that they impose on users or those associated with them. In this paper, we survey the current state of the art on mobile computing research, focusing on privacy risks and data leakage effects. We then discuss a number of methods, recommendations, and ongoing research in limiting the privacy leakages and associated risks by mobile computing.
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