ﻻ يوجد ملخص باللغة العربية
Isolated qubits are a special class of quantum devices, which can be used to implement tamper-resistant cryptographic hardware such as one-time memories (OTMs). Unfortunately, these OTM constructions leak some information, and standard methods for privacy amplification cannot be applied here, because the adversary has advance knowledge of the hash function that the honest parties will use. In this paper we show a stronger form of privacy amplification that solves this problem, using a fixed hash function that is secure against all possible adversaries in the isolated qubits model. This allows us to construct single-bit OTMs which only leak an exponentially small amount of information. We then study a natural generalization of the isolated qubits model, where the adversary is allowed to perform a polynomially-bounded number of entangling gates, in addition to unbounded local operations and classical communication (LOCC). We show that our technique for privacy amplification is also secure in this setting.
One-time memories (OTMs) are simple, tamper-resistant cryptographic devices, which can be used to implement sophisticated functionalities such as one-time programs. Can one construct OTMs whose security follows from some physical principle? This is n
We demonstrate heralded qubit amplification for Time-Bin and Fock-state qubits in an all-fibre, telecom-wavelength, scheme that highlights the simplicity, the stability and potential for fully integrated photonic solutions. Exploiting high-efficiency
We prove an achievability result for privacy amplification and decoupling in terms of the sandwiched Renyi entropy of order $alpha in (1,2]$; this extends previous results which worked for $alpha=2$. The fact that this proof works for $alpha$ close t
Privacy amplification is an indispensable step in the post-processing of quantum key distribution, which can be used to compress the redundancy of shared key and improve the security level of the key. The commonly used privacy amplification is based
One-time memories (OTMs) are simple tamper-resistant cryptographic devices, which can be used to implement one-time programs, a very general form of software protection and program obfuscation. Here we investigate the possibility of building OTMs usi