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We propose a class of attacks on quantum key distribution (QKD) systems where an eavesdropper actively engineers new loopholes by using damaging laser illumination to permanently change properties of system components. This can turn a perfect QKD system into a completely insecure system. A proof-of-principle experiment performed on an avalanche photodiode-based detector shows that laser damage can be used to create loopholes. After about 1 W illumination, the detectors dark count rate reduces 2 to 5 times, permanently improving single-photon counting performance. After about 1.5 W, the detectors switch permanently into the linear photodetection mode and become completely insecure for QKD applications.
We show that radiation damage to unstained biological specimens is not an intractable problem in electron microscopy. When a structural hypothesis of a specimen is available, quantum mechanical principles allow us to verify the hypothesis with a very
Practical quantum communication (QC) protocols are assumed to be secure provided implemented devices are properly characterized and all known side channels are closed. We show that this is not always true. We demonstrate a laser-damage attack capable
This is a chapter on quantum cryptography for the book A Multidisciplinary Introduction to Information Security to be published by CRC Press in 2011/2012. The chapter aims to introduce the topic to undergraduate-level and continuing-education student
Quantum cryptography is a new method for secret communications offering the ultimate security assurance of the inviolability of a Law of Nature. In this paper we shall describe the theory of quantum cryptography, its potential relevance and the devel
Quantum cryptography is arguably the fastest growing area in quantum information science. Novel theoretical protocols are designed on a regular basis, security proofs are constantly improving, and experiments are gradually moving from proof-of-princi