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Everyone is concerned about the Internet security, yet most traffic is not cryptographically protected. The usual justification is that most attackers are only off-path and cannot intercept traffic; hence, challenge-response mechanisms suffice to ensure authenticity. Usually, the challenges re-use existing `unpredictable header fields to protect widely-deployed protocols such as TCP and DNS. We argue that this practice may often only give an illusion of security. We present recent off-path TCP injection and DNS poisoning attacks, enabling attackers to circumvent existing challenge-response defenses. Both TCP and DNS attacks are non-trivial, yet very efficient and practical. The attacks foil widely deployed security mechanisms, such as the Same Origin Policy, and allow a wide range of exploits, e.g., long-term caching of malicious objects and scripts. We hope that this article will motivate adoption of cryptographic mechanisms such as SSL/TLS, IPsec and DNSSEC, and of correct, secure challenge-response mechanisms.
Consider impersonation attack by an active malicious nano node (Eve) on a diffusion based molecular communication (DbMC) system---Eve transmits during the idle slots to deceive the nano receiver (Bob) that she is indeed the legitimate nano transmitte
This paper analyses the various authentication systems implemented for enhanced security and private re-position of an individuals log-in credentials. The first part of the paper describes the multi-factor authentication (MFA) systems, which, though
Locimetric authentication is a form of graphical authentication in which users validate their identity by selecting predetermined points on a predetermined image. Its primary advantage over the ubiquitous text-based approach stems from users superior
We present True2F, a system for second-factor authentication that provides the benefits of conventional authentication tokens in the face of phishing and software compromise, while also providing strong protection against token faults and backdoors.
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) are a core component of an Industrial Control System (ICS). However, if a PLC is compromised or the commands sent across a network from the PLCs are spoofed, consequences could be catastrophic. In this work, a no