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تسجيل مستخدم جديدThe Relevance of the Preparation Concept in the Interpretation of Quantum Formalism
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The preparation procedure, an undefined notion in quantum theory, has not had the relevance that it deserves in the interpretation of quantum mechanical formalism. Here we utilize the concepts of identical and similar preparation procedures to show the conceptual differences and mutual interconnections between the statistical and the conventional interpretation of quantum formalism. Although the statistical understanding, and its final logical consequence, hidden variables theories (this connexion being explained in the text), have a great intuitive appeal due to its fewer ontological difficulties, both recent experimental results and some theoretical developments seem to support an epistemic alternative closer to the conventional one. Nevertheless, we must not rule out the possibility that new theorems or new explanatory principles may modify the reigning supremacy of this interpretation.
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