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We study empirically how the fame of WWI fighter-pilot aces, measured in numbers of web pages mentioning them, is related to their achievement, measured in numbers of opponent aircraft destroyed. We find that on the average fame grows exponentially with achievement; the correlation coefficient between achievement and the logarithm of fame is 0.72. The number of people with a particular level of achievement decreases exponentially with the level, leading to a power-law distribution of fame. We propose a stochastic model that can explain the exponential growth of fame with achievement. Next, we hypothesize that the same functional relation between achievement and fame that we found for the aces holds for other professions. This allows us to estimate achievement for professions where an unquestionable and universally accepted measure of achievement does not exist. We apply the method to Nobel Prize winners in Physics. For example, we obtain that Paul Dirac, who is a hundred times less famous than Einstein contributed to physics only two times less. We compare our results with Landaus ranking.
We investigate a pool of international chess title holders born between 1901 and 1943. Using Elo ratings we compute for every player his expected score in a game with a randomly selected player from the pool. We use this figure as players merit. We m
While current studies on complex networks focus on systems that change relatively slowly in time, the structure of the most visited regions of the Web is altered at the timescale from hours to days. Here we investigate the dynamics of visitation of a
We study the motion of substance in a finite channel that belongs to a network. The channel splits to two arms in a node of the network. There is an additional split of the secondary arm. We obtain analytical relationships for the distribution of the
We analyze properties of apportionment functions in context of the problem of allocating seats in the European Parliament. Necessary and sufficient conditions for apportionment functions are investigated. Some exemplary families of apportionment func
One-shot anonymous unselfishness in economic games is commonly explained by social preferences, which assume that people care about the monetary payoffs of others. However, during the last ten years, research has shown that different types of unselfi