اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدSocial Network Games
210
0
0.0
(
0
)
اسأل ChatGPT حول البحث
ﻻ يوجد ملخص باللغة العربية
One of the natural objectives of the field of the social networks is to predict agents behaviour. To better understand the spread of various products through a social network arXiv:1105.2434 introduced a threshold model, in which the nodes influenced by their neighbours can adopt one out of several alternatives. To analyze the consequences of such product adoption we associate here with each such social network a natural strategic game between the agents. In these games the payoff of each player weakly increases when more players choose his strategy, which is exactly opposite to the congestion games. The possibility of not choosing any product results in two special types of (pure) Nash equilibria. We show that such games may have no Nash equilibrium and that determining an existence of a Nash equilibrium, also of a special type, is NP-complete. This implies the same result for a more general class of games, namely polymatrix games. The situation changes when the underlying graph of the social network is a DAG, a simple cycle, or, more generally, has no source nodes. For these three classes we determine the complexity of an existence of (a special type of) Nash equilibria. We also clarify for these categories of games the status and the complexity of the finite best response property (FBRP) and the finite improvement property (FIP). Further, we introduce a new property of the uniform FIP which is satisfied when the underlying graph is a simple cycle, but determining it is co-NP-hard in the general case and also when the underlying graph has no source nodes. The latter complexity results also hold for the property of being a weakly acyclic game. A preliminary version of this paper appeared as [19].
قيم البحث
اقرأ أيضاً
We consider agents in a social network competing to be selected as partners in collaborative, mutually beneficial activities. We study this through a model in which an agent i can initiate a limited number k_i>0 of games and selects the ideal partner
s from its one-hop neighborhood. On the flip side it can accept as many games offered from its neighbors. Each game signifies a productive joint economic activity, and players attempt to maximize their individual utilities. Unsurprisingly, more trustworthy agents are more desirable as partners. Trustworthiness is measured by the game theoretic concept of Limited-Trust, which quantifies the maximum cost an agent is willing to incur in order to improve the net utility of all agents. Agents learn about their neighbors trustworthiness through interactions and their behaviors evolve in response. Empirical trials performed on realistic social networks show that when given the option, many agents become highly trustworthy; most or all become highly trustworthy when knowledge of their neighbors trustworthiness is based on past interactions rather than known a priori. This trustworthiness is not the result of altruism, instead agents are intrinsically motivated to become trustworthy partners by competition. Two insights are presented: first, trustworthy behavior drives an increase in the utility of all agents, where maintaining a relatively modest level of trustworthiness may easily improve net utility by as much as 14.5%. If only one agent exhibits modest trust among self-centered ones, it can increase its average utility by up to 25% in certain cases! Second, and counter-intuitively, when partnership opportunities are abundant agents become less trustworthy.
Recently, Apt and Markakis introduced a model for product adoption in social networks with multiple products, where the agents, influenced by their neighbours, can adopt one out of several alternatives (products). To analyze these networks we introdu
ce social network games in which product adoption is obligatory. We show that when the underlying graph is a simple cycle, there is a polynomial time algorithm allowing us to determine whether the game has a Nash equilibrium. In contrast, in the arbitrary case this problem is NP-complete. We also show that the problem of determining whether the game is weakly acyclic is co-NP hard. Using these games we analyze various types of paradoxes that can arise in the considered networks. One of them corresponds to the well-known Braess paradox in congestion games. In particular, we show that social networks exist with the property that by adding an additional product to a specific node, the choices of the nodes will unavoidably evolve in such a way that everybody is strictly worse off.
Congestion games are a classical type of games studied in game theory, in which n players choose a resource, and their individual cost increases with the number of other players choosing the same resource. In network congestion games (NCGs), the reso
urces correspond to simple paths in a graph, e.g. representing routing options from a source to a target. In this paper, we introduce a variant of NCGs, referred to as dynamic NCGs: in this setting, players take transitions synchronously, they select their next transitions dynamically, and they are charged a cost that depends on the number of players simultaneously using the same transition. We study, from a complexity perspective, standard concepts of game theory in dynamic NCGs: social optima, Nash equilibria, and subgame perfect equilibria. Our contributions are the following: the existence of a strategy profile with social cost bounded by a constant is in PSPACE and NP-hard. (Pure) Nash equilibria always exist in dynamic NCGs; the existence of a Nash equilibrium with bounded cost can be decided in EXPSPACE, and computing a witnessing strategy profile can be done in doubly-exponential time. The existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium with bounded cost can be decided in 2EXPSPACE, and a witnessing strategy profile can be computed in triply-exponential time.
Exclusive social groups are ones in which the group members decide whether or not to admit a candidate to the group. Examples of exclusive social groups include academic departments and fraternal organizations. In the present paper we introduce an an
alytic framework for studying the dynamics of exclusive social groups. In our model, every group member is characterized by his opinion, which is represented as a point on the real line. The group evolves in discrete time steps through a voting process carried out by the groups members. Due to homophily, each member votes for the candidate who is more similar to him (i.e., closer to him on the line). An admission rule is then applied to determine which candidate, if any, is admitted. We consider several natural admission rules including majority and consensus. We ask: how do different admission rules affect the composition of the group in the long term? We study both growing groups (where new members join old ones) and fixed-size groups (where new members replace those who quit). Our analysis reveals intriguing phenomena and phase transitions, some of which are quite counterintuitive.
Social networks have become ubiquitous in our daily life, as such it has attracted great research interests recently. A key challenge is that it is of extremely large-scale with tremendous information flow, creating the phenomenon of Big Data. Under
such a circumstance, understanding information diffusion over social networks has become an important research issue. Most of the existing works on information diffusion analysis are based on either network structure modeling or empirical approach with dataset mining. However, the information diffusion is also heavily influenced by network users decisions, actions and their socio-economic connections, which is generally ignored in existing works. In this paper, we propose an evolutionary game theoretic framework to model the dynamic information diffusion process in social networks. Specifically, we analyze the framework in uniform degree and non-uniform degree networks and derive the closed-form expressions of the evolutionary stable network states. Moreover, the information diffusion over two special networks, ErdH{o}s-Renyi random network and the Barabasi-Albert scale-free network, are also highlighted. To verify our theoretical analysis, we conduct experiments by using both synthetic networks and real-world Facebook network, as well as real-world information spreading dataset of Twitter and Memetracker. Experiments shows that the proposed game theoretic framework is effective and practical in modeling the social network users information forwarding behaviors.
سجل دخول لتتمكن من نشر تعليقات
التعليقات
جاري جلب التعليقات
سجل دخول لتتمكن من متابعة معايير البحث التي قمت باختيارها
