اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدFairness in society
291
0
0.0
(
0
)
تأليف
Ophir Flomenbom
اسأل ChatGPT حول البحث
ﻻ يوجد ملخص باللغة العربية
Models that explain the economical and political realities of nowadays societies should help all the worlds citizens. Yet, the last four years showed that the current models are missing. Here we develop a dynamical society-deciders model showing that the long lasting economical stress can be solved when increasing fairness in nations. fairness is computed for each nation using indicators from economy and politics. Rather than austerity versus spending, the dynamical model suggests that solving crises in western societies is possible with regulations that reduce the stability of the deciders, while shifting wealth in the direction of the people. This shall increase the dynamics among socio-economic classes, further increasing fairness.
قيم البحث
اقرأ أيضاً
Societies change through time, entailing changes in behaviors and institutions. We ask how social change occurs when behaviors and institutions are interdependent. We model a group-structured society in which the transmission of individual behavior o
ccurs in parallel with the selection of group-level institutions. We consider a cooperative behavior that generates collective benefits for groups but does not spread between individuals on its own. Groups exhibit institutions that increase the diffusion of the behavior within the group, but also incur a group cost. Groups adopt institutions in proportion to their fitness. Finally, cooperative behavior may also spread globally. As expected, we find that cooperation and institutions are mutually reinforcing. But the model also generates behavioral source-sink dynamics when cooperation generated in institutional groups spreads to non-institutional groups, boosting their fitness. Consequently, the global diffusion of cooperation creates a pattern of institutional free-riding that limits the evolution of group-beneficial institutions. Our model suggests that, in a group-structured society, large-scale change in behavior and institutions (i.e. social change) can be best achieved when the two remain correlated, such as through the spread successful pilot programs.
Our society is changing. Almost nothing these days works without a computer chip. Computing power doubles every 18 months, and in ten years it will probably exceed the capabilities of a human brain. Computers perform approximately 70 percent of all f
inancial transactions today and IBMs Watson now seems to give better customer advise than some human telephone hotlines. What does this imply for our future society?
Peer punishment of free-riders (defectors) is a key mechanism for promoting cooperation in society. However, it is highly unstable since some cooperators may contribute to a common project but refuse to punish defectors. Centralized sanctioning insti
tutions (for example, tax-funded police and criminal courts) can solve this problem by punishing both defectors and cooperators who refuse to punish. These institutions have been shown to emerge naturally through social learning and then displace all other forms of punishment, including peer punishment. However, this result provokes a number of questions. If centralized sanctioning is so successful, then why do many highly authoritarian states suffer from low levels of cooperation? Why do states with high levels of public good provision tend to rely more on citizen-driven peer punishment? And what happens if centralized institutions can be circumvented by individual acts of bribery? Here, we consider how corruption influences the evolution of cooperation and punishment. Our model shows that the effectiveness of centralized punishment in promoting cooperation breaks down when some actors in the model are allowed to bribe centralized authorities. Counterintuitively, increasing the sanctioning power of the central institution makes things even worse, since this prevents peer punishers from playing a role in maintaining cooperation. As a result, a weaker centralized authority is actually more effective because it allows peer punishment to restore cooperation in the presence of corruption. Our results provide an evolutionary rationale for why public goods provision rarely flourishes in polities that rely only on strong centralized institutions. Instead, cooperation requires both decentralized and centralized enforcement. These results help to explain why citizen participation is a fundamental necessity for policing the commons.
Nanotechnology has emerged as a broad, exciting, yet ill-defined field of scientific research and technological innovation. There are important questions about the technologys potential economic, social, and environmental implications. We discuss an
undergraduate course on nanoscience and nanotechnology for students from a wide range of disciplines, including the natural and social sciences, the humanities, and engineering. The course explores these questions and the broader place of technology in contemporary societies. The course is built around active learning methods and seeks to develop the students critical thinking skills, written and verbal communication abilities, and general knowledge of nanoscience and nanoengineering concepts. Continuous assessment was used to gain information about the effectiveness of class discussions and enhancement of student understanding of the interaction between nanotechnology and society.
Recommender systems are one of the most widely used services on several online platforms to suggest potential items to the end-users. These services often use different machine learning techniques for which fairness is a concerning factor, especially
when the downstream services have the ability to cause social ramifications. Thus, focusing on the non-personalised (global) recommendations in news media platforms (e.g., top-k trending topics on Twitter, top-k news on a news platform, etc.), we discuss on two specific fairness concerns together (traditionally studied separately)---user fairness and organisational fairness. While user fairness captures the idea of representing the choices of all the individual users in the case of global recommendations, organisational fairness tries to ensure politically/ideologically balanced recommendation sets. This makes user fairness a user-side requirement and organisational fairness a platform-side requirement. For user fairness, we test with methods from social choice theory, i.e., various voting rules known to better represent user choices in their results. Even in our application of voting rules to the recommendation setup, we observe high user satisfaction scores. Now for organisational fairness, we propose a bias metric which measures the aggregate ideological bias of a recommended set of items (articles). Analysing the results obtained from voting rule-based recommendation, we find that while the well-known voting rules are better from the user side, they show high bias values and clearly not suitable for organisational requirements of the platforms. Thus, there is a need to build an encompassing mechanism by cohesively bridging ideas of user fairness and organisational fairness. In this abstract paper, we intend to frame the elementary ideas along with the clear motivation behind the requirement of such a mechanism.
سجل دخول لتتمكن من نشر تعليقات
التعليقات
جاري جلب التعليقات
سجل دخول لتتمكن من متابعة معايير البحث التي قمت باختيارها
