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تسجيل مستخدم جديدRobustness Analysis for Battery Supported Cyber-Physical Systems
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This paper establishes a novel analytical approach to quantify robustness of scheduling and battery management for battery supported cyber-physical systems. A dynamic schedulability test is introduced to determine whether tasks are schedulable within a finite time window. The test is used to measure robustness of a real-time scheduling algorithm by evaluating the strength of computing time perturbations that break schedulability at runtime. Robustness of battery management is quantified analytically by an adaptive threshold on the state of charge. The adaptive threshold significantly reduces the false alarm rate for battery management algorithms to decide when a battery needs to be replaced.
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