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تسجيل مستخدم جديدThe Potluck Problem
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This paper proposes the Potluck Problem as a model for the behavior of independent producers and consumers under standard economic assumptions, as a problem of resource allocation in a multi-agent system in which there is no explicit communication among the agents.
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