اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدEmergence of product differentiation from consumer heterogeneity and asymmetric information
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We introduce a fully probabilistic framework of consumer product choice based on quality assessment. It allows us to capture many aspects of marketing such as partial information asymmetry, quality differentiation, and product placement in a supermarket.
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