اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدMultistep Bayesian strategy in coin-tossing games and its application to asset trading games in continuous time
134
0
0.0
(
0
)
اسأل ChatGPT حول البحث
ﻻ يوجد ملخص باللغة العربية
We study multistep Bayesian betting strategies in coin-tossing games in the framework of game-theoretic probability of Shafer and Vovk (2001). We show that by a countable mixture of these strategies, a gambler or an investor can exploit arbitrary patterns of deviations of natures moves from independent Bernoulli trials. We then apply our scheme to asset trading games in continuous time and derive the exponential growth rate of the investors capital when the variation exponent of the asset price path deviates from two.
قيم البحث
اقرأ أيضاً
We introduce a new formulation of asset trading games in continuous time in the framework of the game-theoretic probability established by Shafer and Vovk (Probability and Finance: Its Only a Game! (2001) Wiley). In our formulation, the market moves
continuously, but an investor trades in discrete times, which can depend on the past path of the market. We prove that an investor can essentially force that the asset price path behaves with the variation exponent exactly equal to two. Our proof is based on embedding high-frequency discrete-time games into the continuous-time game and the use of the Bayesian strategy of Kumon, Takemura and Takeuchi (Stoch. Anal. Appl. 26 (2008) 1161--1180) for discrete-time coin-tossing games. We also show that the main growth part of the investors capital processes is clearly described by the information quantities, which are derived from the Kullback--Leibler information with respect to the empirical fluctuation of the asset price.
We study capital process behavior in the fair-coin game and biased-coin games in the framework of the game-theoretic probability of Shafer and Vovk (2001). We show that if Skeptic uses a Bayesian strategy with a beta prior, the capital process is luc
idly expressed in terms of the past average of Realitys moves. From this it is proved that the Skeptics Bayesian strategy weakly forces the strong law of large numbers (SLLN) with the convergence rate of O(sqrt{log n/n})$ and if Reality violates SLLN then the exponential growth rate of the capital process is very accurately described in terms of the Kullback divergence between the average of Realitys moves when she violates SLLN and the average when she observes SLLN. We also investigate optimality properties associated with Bayesian strategy.
The large majority of risk-sharing transactions involve few agents, each of whom can heavily influence the structure and the prices of securities. This paper proposes a game where agents strategic sets consist of all possible sharing securities and p
ricing kernels that are consistent with Arrow-Debreu sharing rules. First, it is shown that agents best response problems have unique solutions. The risk-sharing Nash equilibrium admits a finite-dimensional characterisation and it is proved to exist for arbitrary number of agents and be unique in the two-agent game. In equilibrium, agents declare beliefs on future random outcomes different than their actual probability assessments, and the risk-sharing securities are endogenously bounded, implying (among other things) loss of efficiency. In addition, an analysis regarding extremely risk tolerant agents indicates that they profit more from the Nash risk-sharing equilibrium as compared to the Arrow-Debreu one.
This article comes up with an intraday trading strategy under T+1 using Markowitz optimization and Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) with published stock data obtained from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and Shanghai Stock Exchange. The empirical results reve
al the profitability of Markowitz portfolio optimization and validate the intraday stock price prediction using MLP. The findings further combine the Markowitz optimization, an MLP with the trading strategy, to clarify this strategys feasibility.
We present a comprehensive study of utility function of the minority game in its efficient regime. We develop an effective description of state of the game. For the payoff function $g(x)=sgn (x)$ we explicitly represent the game as the Markov process
and prove the finitness of number of states. We also demonstrate boundedness of the utility function. Using these facts we can explain all interesting observable features of the aggregated demand: appearance of strong fluctuations, their periodicity and existence of prefered levels. For another payoff, $g(x)=x$, the number of states is still finite and utility remains bounded but the number of states cannot be reduced and probabilities of states are not calculated. However, using properties of the utility and analysing the game in terms of de Bruijn graphs, we can also explain distinct peaks of demand and their frequencies.
سجل دخول لتتمكن من نشر تعليقات
التعليقات
جاري جلب التعليقات
سجل دخول لتتمكن من متابعة معايير البحث التي قمت باختيارها
