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We develop a model of tax evasion based on the Ising model. We augment the model using an appropriate enforcement mechanism that may allow policy makers to curb tax evasion. With a certain probability tax evaders are subject to an audit. If they get caught they behave honestly for a certain number of periods. Simulating the model for a range of parameter combinations, we show that tax evasion may be controlled effectively by using punishment as an enforcement mechanism.
Within the context of agent-based Monte-Carlo simulations, we study the well-known majority-vote model (MVM) with noise applied to tax evasion on simple square lattices, Voronoi-Delaunay random lattices, Barabasi-Albert networks, and Erdos-Renyi rand
A dynamic agent model is introduced with an annual random wealth multiplicative process followed by taxes paid according to a linear wealth-dependent tax rate. If poor agents pay higher tax rates than rich agents, eventually all wealth becomes concen
Within the context of agent-based Monte-Carlo simulations, we study the well-known majority-vote model (MVM) with noise applied to tax evasion on Stauffer-Hohnisch-Pittnauer (SHP) networks. To control the fluctuations for tax evasion in the economics
In this research, the tax evasion percentage, as order parameter, of a system of individuals or agents inscribed in a $N = L times L$ 2D square grid is computed. The influence of local environment over each agent is quantified both through competitiv
This short review presents a selected history of the mutual fertilization between physics and economics, from Isaac Newton and Adam Smith to the present. The fundamentally different perspectives embraced in theories developed in financial economics c